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All my treasure, which should purchase thee,
Sighs, tears, and oaths, and letters, I have spent.
Yet no more can be due to me
Than at the bargain made was meant .
-John Donne, Lovers' Infinitenesst
Restitution has long been recognized as an optional remedy for breach
of contract,1 and most of the rules governing this remedy have been ac-
cepted without much controversy.' If the plaintiff is a buyer of property
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1. Plaintiffs usually choose an alternative remedy. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
373 comment a (1979) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]. The alternative remedies are
damages and specific performance. The purpose of damages is to put the plaintiff in a position eco-
nomically equivalent to the position he would have held, if the contract had been performed (plain-
tiff's "expectancy"). See, e.g., Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 117, 146 A. 641, 643 (1929); J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14-4 (2d ed. 1977); 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 992 (1964); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 329 comment a (1932) [hereinafter cited
as RESTATEMENT]. The purpose of specific performance is to approximate the effects of voluntary
performance by compelling the defendant to render as nearly as practicable the very performance she
promised. See, e.g., Beckwith v. Clark, 188 F. 171, 178 (8th Cir. 1911); 5 A. CORBIN, supra, § 1102;
5A A. CORBIN, supra, § 1138; RESTATEMENT, supra, § 358(1) comment a.
As a remedy for breach, "restitution" means either the restoration of a specific thing or the payment
in money of the value of a contractual performance rendered by plaintiff. RESTATEMENT, supra, §
326(b). There is considerable confusion as to the purpose of the restitutionary remedy. It is sometimes
said that the purpose is to restore both parties to their pre-contract positions. See, e.g., Bollenback v.
Continental Casualty Co., 243 Or. 498, 518, 414 P.2d 802, 812 (1966); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO,
supra, § 15-1; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra, § 384 comment a. This purpose is unattainable if
defendant's gain from plaintiff's performance is greater than or less than plaintiff's loss, and plaintiff's
performance is restored not in specie, but in money. Many authorities state that the chief purpose of
the restitutionary remedy is to restore plaintiff to his pre-contract position. See, e.g., Acme Process
Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509, 530 (Ct. Cl. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 385 U.S. 138
(1966); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra, § 15-4; 5 A. CORBIN, supra, § 1102; RESTATEMENT,
supra, § 347 comment b. Other authorities state that the purpose of restitution as a remedy for breach
of contract is to prevent defendant's unjust enrichment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra, § 344
comments a & d, § 345 (c), (d) & comment c, § 373 comment a.
2. The plaintiff will be given the option to elect restitution only if the defendant's breach is a
"total" breach discharging plaintiff's duty of further performance. See, e.g., Neenan v. Otis Elevator
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or services' and has paid all or part of the contract price when the defen-
dant breaches, the plaintiff is entitled to restitution of the money he has
paid.4 When the plaintiff is a seller who has fully performed his side of
the bargain, and the breaching defendant owes only a liquidated debt, the
plaintiff is limited to an action for the contract price and cannot obtain
restitution.5 If the plaintiff is a seller who has partially performed, and
the partial performance can be restored in specie, the breaching defendant
may be ordered to make specific restitution.'
A controversial issue arises, however, when plaintiff is a seller who has
partially performed, and the partial performance cannot be returned in
specie. This Article argues that the partially performing seller should not
be awarded money restitution as a remedy for breach and should be lim-
Co., 180 F. 997, 1000 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910), af'd, 194 F. 414 (2d Cir. 1912); Buffalo Builders
Supply Co. v. Recb, 247 N.Y. 170, 159 N.E. 899 (1928); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 1, §
15-3; 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 1, § 1104; RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 347 comment e. But see 1
G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 4.5 (1978) (discussing exceptions to requirement of total
breach). The requisite breach may also be referred to as "material," "essential," "vital," or "substan-
tial." See 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 1, § 1104.
If defendant has rendered partial performance but has nevertheless committed a total breach enti-
tling plaintiff to restitution, plaintiff's restitution is dependent upon his restoring (either in specie or
in money value) the partial performance rendered by the defendant. 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 1, §§
1114-1116.
3. Throughout this Article, I use "buyer" as a generic term for buyers of goods, vendees of land,
employers, and any others who pay money in exchange for property or services. I use "seller" as a
generic term for sellers of goods, vendors of land, employees, and any others who provide property or
services in exchange for money. Except for the uncommon barter exchange, all exchange contracts
involve a "buyer" and a "seller."
4. E.g., Nash v. Towne, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 689, 701-02 (1866); Bush v. Canfield, 2 Conn. 485,
488 (1818); 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 1, § 1108; 1 G. PALMER, supra note 2, § 4.3, at 382.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a buyer of goods recovers the money he has paid for those
goods. U.C.C. § 2-711(1) (1977). To the extent that the buyer has accepted the goods and failed to
effectively revoke acceptance, however, he is limited to an action for damages under § 2-714. U.C.C. §
2-711(1) & comment 1 (1977).
5. E.g., Oliver v. Campbell, 43 Cal. 2d 298, 306, 273 P.2d 15, 20 (1954); Lynch v. Stebbins, 127
Me. 203, 206, 142 A. 735, 736 (1928); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 1, § 15-6; 5 A.
CORBIN, supra note 1, § 1110; 1 G. PALMER, supra note 2, § 4.3; RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 350;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 373(2).
Similarly, if a seller fully performs a severable portion of a divisible contract and the breaching
buyer owes only a liquidated sum of money for that performance, the seller cannot obtain restitution
for that performance. E.g., Dibol v. Minott, 9 Iowa 403, 405 (1859); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO,
supra note 1, § 15-6; 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 1, § 1111; RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 351.
6. See 1 G. PALMER, supra note 2, § 4.7(a). It is often stated that specific restitution is not
available unless money damages and money restitution are inadequate remedies. See, e.g., J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 1, § 15-5; 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 1, § 1120; RESTATEMENT,
supra note 1, § 354. But see I G. PALMER, supra note 2, § 4.7(a) (observing that such statements are
not supported by court decisions); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 372 & Reporter's note
(advocating abandonment of requirement that money relief be inadequate).
Issues concerning specific restitution of a seller's partial performance do not arise often. Partial
performance usually occurs in cases involving contracts for services, real estate construction, or goods.
Services and construction cannot be returned in specie. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, specific
restitution for a seller of goods appears to be limited to the relief provided by § 2-702(2) (reclamation
from insolvent buyer on credit) and § 2-507(2) (buyer's failure to make effective payment in a cash
sale). See R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES §§ 165, 166 (1970).
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ited to his expectancy damages. Part I surveys the various measures of
money restitution used by the courts in this situation. Part II compares
the efficiency properties of restitution and expectancy damages and shows
that arguments for or against restitution cannot rest on notions of eco-
nomic efficiency. Part III demonstrates that money restitution for the par-
tially performing seller is incompatible with liberal principles of law.
Given its interference with personal liberty, and the lack of a counter-
vailing economic argument, restitution is not a desirable remedy. Part IV
concludes that, in fact, the case of a plaintiff seller who has partially per-
formed is an isolated example of an area of restitution law at odds with
liberal principles.
I. The Measure of Money Restitution for Seller's Partial Performance
Assume that Contractor and Owner enter into a construction contract.
Contractor is to build a house on Owner's land for the contract price of
$50,000. (I will unrealistically assume that the contract price is not due
until completion of the house.) Contractor calculates that his total costs
will be $40,000 and that he will thus make a profit of $10,000. As the
work progresses, however, Contractor discovers that full performance will
actually cost $60,000. When Contractor has incurred costs of $48,000 in
partial performance, Owner repudiates the contract (a total breach). Con-
tractor terminates his work, leaving Owner with a nearly completed house
for which Owner has paid nothing. The market value of Contractor's par-
tial performance is $64,000 (Owner would have had to spend $64,000 to
obtain the same work from another contractor). The market value of Con-
tractor's full performance would be $80,000 (Owner would have had to
spend $80,000 to obtain a complete house from another contractor). The
nearly completed house has enhanced the value of the Owner's property
by $72,000. (Assume that for another $18,000, Owner can have a finished
house adding $90,000 to the value of her real estate.)
If Contractor sues Owner for breach of contract, he can recover expec-
tancy damages of $38,000." What can Contractor recover if he chooses the
alternative remedy of restitution?8 His partial performance cannot be re-
7. Contractor has incurred costs of $48,000 and has received no payment. Expectancy damages of
$38,000 leave Contractor with the $10,000 net loss he would have had if the contract had been per-
formed. See supra note 1 (discussing purpose of expectancy damages). If a contractor has partially
performed a construction contract when the owner breaches, the contractor's damages usually are the
unpaid contract price minus the cost of completion (the cost the contractor would have incurred in
finishing the job). See, e.g., Guerini Stone Co. v. Carlin Constr. Co., 240 U.S. 264 (1916); Millen v.
Gulesian, 229 Mass. 27, 118 N.E. 267 (1918); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 1, § 14-28; 5
A. CORBIN, supra note 1, § 1094; RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 346(2)(a). In our hypothetical, the
unpaid contract price is $50,000 and the cost of completion is $12,000. (Contractor has already spent
$48,000, and total costs would be $60,000.) Contractor's expectancy damages are thus $38,000.
8. Although market value of the partial performance is the prevailing measure, a number of
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turned in specie, so restitution will be in the form of money. How much
money?
A. Market Value of Seller's Partial Performance
The prevailing view is that a seller's restitutionary recovery is measured
by the market value of his partial performance (as of the time of perform-
ance), even if this market value exceeds the contract rate for such partial
performance or exceeds the contract price for full performance.9 Under
this rule, Contractor would recover $64,000 as restitution for Owner's
breach.
Market value restitution enables Contractor to avoid the loss he would
have suffered had the contract been performed. Full performance would
have yielded Contractor a net loss of $10,000 ($50,000 contract price mi-
nus $60,000 costs). As a result of Owner's breach and a market value
restitutionary recovery, Contractor obtains from his partial performance a
$16,000 net profit ($64,000 restitution minus $48,000 costs). Contractor
also receives more gross income for partial performance than he would
have received for full performance. If Contractor had fully performed, res-
titution would be precluded by the full performance rule,10 and Contrac-
tor would be limited to an action for the $50,000 contract price. But be-
cause he has only partially performed, he obtains $64,000 by way of
restitution. Market value restitution thus provides greater reward for less
work.
Perhaps the best explanation for the prevailing rule is that market
value is a good proxy for the value to both parties of plaintiff's partial
performance. When Contractor provides a partial performance having a
market value of $64,000, he gives up labor and resources he could have
sold in the marketplace for $64,000; he has thus suffered an opportunity
cost of $64,000. Owner has gained something for which she would have
had to pay $64,000 in the marketplace. A restitutionary transfer of
$64,000 from Owner to Contractor would thus seem to deprive Owner of
courts have rejected it, thus provoking debate among the commentators. Compare Childres &
Garamella, The Law of Restitution and the Reliance Interest in Contract, 64 NW. U.L. REV. 433
(1969) (generally favoring contract rate restitution) with Palmer, The Contract Price as a Limit on
Restitution for Defendant's Breach, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 264, 268-79 (1959) (favoring market value
restitution without contract price or contract rate limitation). Many of the conflicting arguments are
summarized in D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.5, at 271-73, § 12.1, at 794-95,
§ 12.24, at 915-18 (1973).
9. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Building Rentals Corp. v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 498
F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Coastal Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Algernon Blair, Inc.,
479 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Stringfellow, 414 F.2d 696
(5th Cir. 1969); Scaduto v. Orlando, 381 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1967); Posner v. Seder, 184 Mass. 331, 68
N.E. 335 (1903); 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 1, §§ 1112, 1113; 1 G. PALMER, supra note 2, §§ 4.2,
4.4(a)-(b); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 347 & comment c.
10. See supra p. 15.
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her unjust gain and restore to Contractor the very value he had lost.
This explanation is untenable, however, in view of the rule that a
plaintiff-seller recovers the market value of any bargained-for perform-
ance, even if defendant never derived any economic benefit from it." As
Corbin observes:
It is clear that the availability of restitution as a remedy for breach
of contract does not depend wholly upon the idea that the defendant
has been unjustly enriched by the part performance rendered by the
plaintiff. There need be no addition to his material wealth, either
permanent or temporary.
12
Restitution, then, need not restore each party to the status quo ante;
instead, courts often seem to compensate the plaintiff for a lost market
opportunity, regardless of the effect on the breaching party.
B. Market Value with Contract Price Ceiling
A few decisions allow the plaintiff seller to recover market value resti-
tution for partial performance, but do not permit such recovery to exceed
the total contract price."3 This prevents the seller from receiving more
gross revenue for partial performance than he could have received for full
performance. In our hypothetical, Contractor would obtain restitution of
$50,000 under this rule; although the market value of his part perform-
ance was $64,000, the contract price was only $50,000.
A contract price ceiling on market value restitution reflects the unwill-
ingness of some courts to ignore completely the terms of contracts; the
plaintiff ought not recover more than he could have earned under the con-
tract terms.
C. Contract Rate as the Measure of Restitution
Some courts have used the contract rate as the measure of restitution for
seller's part performance; plaintiff seller receives only the amount that,
according to the contract terms, has been earned by his part performance.
If the contract price was expressed in dollars per unit of performance, the
seller recovers at that contract rate for the units he has performed.
1 4
If the contract price was not expressed in dollars per unit of perform-
11. For discussion of the rule, see 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 1, § 1107; 1 G. PALMER, supra note 2,
§ 4.2; RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 348 comment a.
12. 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 1, § 1107, at 577.
13. See Johnson v. Bovee, 40 Colo. App. 317, 574 P.2d 513 (1978); Harrison v. Hancock, 2 Neb.
522, 89 N.W. 374 (1902); Wuchter v. Fitzgerald, 83 Or. 672, 163 P. 819 (1917).
14. Kehoe v. Mayor of Rutherford, 56 N.J.L. 23, 27 A. 912 (1893); Doolittle v. McCullough, 12
Ohio St. 360 (1861); Bailey v. Furleigh, 121 Wash. 207, 208 P. 1091 (1922).
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ance, but only as a lump sum, contract rate restitution is computed by
prorating the contract price. Courts have performed the allocation in two
ways. Under the first method, seller's restitutionary recovery bears the
same ratio to the total contract price as the market value of seller's part
performance bears to the market value of seller's full performance.15
Under the second method, seller's restitutionary recovery bears the same
ratio to the total contract price as seller's cost incurred in part perform-
ance bears to the total cost seller would have incurred in full perform-
ance.16 In our hypothetical, Contractor would recover $40,000 under ei-
ther method.
17
Contractor's $40,000 recovery at the contract rate is less than the
$64,000 he would receive if restitution were measured by the market
value of his part performance. It is also less than the $50,000 he would
recover if the court used market value with a contract price ceiling. But it
is more than the $38,000 he would recover as expectancy damages.
Contract rate restitution gives the plaintiff seller that portion of his
total expectancy allocable to his part performance, but it ignores that por-
tion of his total expectancy allocable to the remainder of the contract. In
our hypothetical, Contractor's total expectancy is a $10,000 net loss. He
has performed four-fifths of his contract (measured on either a cost or
market value basis). Contract rate restitution of $40,000 leaves him with a
net loss of $8000 (he has incurred costs of $48,000 and received $40,000
restitution); this is four-fifths of his total expectancy.
D. Restitution Measured by Seller's Costs Incurred
At least one decision indicates that the proper measure of restitution for
a seller's partial performance is the seller's costs incurred in good faith.18
In our hypothetical, restitution measured by Contractor's costs would
amount to $48,000. Although this is less than market value restitution
($64,000) and less than market value restitution with a contract price ceil-
15. This appears to be the method adopted in Noyes v. Pugin, 2 Wash. 653, 27 P. 548 (1891).
16. This is the method the trial court used in Kehoe v. Mayor of Rutherford, 56 N.J.L. 23, 27 A.
912 (1893).
17. The relevant ratio for the percentage-of-market value method is 40,000/50,000 = 64,000/
80,000. The corresponding ratio for the percentage-of-cost method is 40,000/50,000 = 48,000/
60,000. The percentage-of-market value method and the percentage-of-cost method will not always
produce the same result. For example, a contractor may have incurred one-half of his total costs and
yet have provided labor and materials having a market value that is only two-fifths of the market
value of full performance.
18. See Philadelphia v. Tripple, 230 Pa. 480, 79 A. 703 (1911) (suggesting that seller can recover
his costs even though they exceed the contract price). Some decisions recognize market value as the
normal measure of restitution but permit restitution to be measured by seller's reasonable costs if
there is no contrary evidence of market value. United States cx rel. Susi Contracting Co. v. Zara
Contracting Co., 146 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1944); Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d
509 (Ct. Cl. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 385 U.S. 138 (1966).
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ing ($50,000), it exceeds contract rate restitution ($40,000) and Contrac-
tor's expectancy damages ($38,000).
If restitution measured by seller's costs incurred is designed to restore
seller to his pre-contract position, it would frequently fail to achieve its
purpose. Cost restitution compensates the partially performing seller only
for explicit costs and does not compensate for any profit he could have
made by selling his output to someone other than the defendant buyer, an
opportunity seller had in the pre-contract position, but gave up in con-
tracting with the defendant.
E. Measuring Restitution by Defendant's Economic Gain
If eliminating defendant buyer's unjust enrichment were the goal of the
restitutionary remedy, one might expect restitution for seller's partial per-
formance to be measured by defendant's economic gain. In our hypotheti-
cal, this would seem to require restitution to Contractor of $72,000, the
amount by which the value of Owner's property has been increased by
Contractor's partial performance. But the courts do not consider the in-
crease in defendant's wealth. The prevailing practice is reflected in the
comments to the Restatement of Contracts:
If the plaintiff's performance is part of the very performance for
which the defendant bargained as part of an agreed exchange, it is to
be valued, not by the extent to which the defendant's total wealth
has been increased thereby, but by the amount for which such ser-
vices and materials as constituted the part performance could have
been purchased from one in the plaintiff's position at the time they
were rendered.19
F. Summary
We have considered five alternative methods of measuring money resti-
tution as a breach of contract remedy for a seller who has partially per-
formed.2" I have not discussed the relative merit of these alternatives in
19. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 347 comment c; see 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 1, § 1107; 1 G.
PALMER, supra note 2, § 4.2.
20. It is not clear whether, under the Uniform Commercial Code, the partially performing seller
gets contract rate restitution, market value restitution, or his expectancy. The Code appears to favor
contract rate restitution. According to § 2-607(1), the buyer must pay at the contract rate for any
goods accepted. Comment 1 to § 2-607 states that if part of the goods has been delivered and accepted,
the price to be paid for the accepted goods is to be reasonably apportioned at the contract rate, using
the type of apportionment employed in quantum valebat cases. In those cases, however, the courts
award "reasonable value" (market value). See Bartow Guano Co. v. Adair, 29 Ga. App. 644, 116
S.E. 342 (1923); D. DOBBS, supra note 8, § 4.2, at 237-38.
Indeed, some commentators have argued that market value restitution is available in cases governed
by the Code, since seller can cancel the contract under § 2-703(f) and, thus, under § 1-103 (which
supplements Code provisions with general principles of law and equity) become entitled to the coin-
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detail because I shall argue that, regardless of the measure used, money
restitution is an improper remedy for breach of contract when the plaintiff
is a partially performing seller. Such a plaintiff should be limited to his
expectancy damages.
II. Restitution and Expectancy Damages: An Economic Analysis
As noted above, the prevailing view allows a partially performing seller
to elect market value restitution as a remedy for the buyer's breach of
contract (assuming that specific restitution is not appropriate). It has been
argued, however, that restitution is less efficient than expectancy damages.
In fact, this is so only if one ignores transaction costs. When transaction
costs are taken into account, expectancy damages may not be more effi-
cient than restitution.
A. Expectancy Damages and the Theory of Efficient Breach
The economic argument for expectancy damages asserts that in some
situations, breach is more efficient than performance of the contract, and
the expectancy damages remedy encourages breach, whereas market value
restitution2 1 encourages performance. When, in the absence of any legal
remedy, D's incremental gain from her own breach exceeds P's incremen-
tal loss, breach is more efficient in terms of aggregate welfare than per-
formance.22 If, in such situations, the only legal remedy for breach is ex-
pectancy damages, then D will breach and pay expectancy damages that
compensate P for his loss. This will leave P in the same economic position
he would have been in had D performed, and D will still be better off
than she would have been had she performed. 3 Since one party is made
better off and the other party no worse off, aggregate welfare has been
mon law remedy available to a seller who has rescinded upon buyer's breach: market value restitution.
See Nordstrom, Restitution on Default and Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, 19 VAND.
L. REV. 1143, 1166 (1966); see also 1 G. PALMER, supra note 2, § 4.16(a) (stating that Code remedies
should not be regarded as exclusive). This argument is a weak one, however, because § 2-703 permits
a seller to cancel only with respect to the undelivered balance.
It can also be argued that seller cannot recover more for his part performance than the amount that
gives him his expectancy. According to § 1-106(1), remedies should put plaintiff in as good a position
as if the other party had fully performed. If "as good a position" means no worse and no better, no
remedy for breach should give plaintiff more than his expectancy.
21. Expectancy damages will be compared only with market value restitution, but the same con-
clusion would follow from a comparison to any of the alternative measures of money restitution, each
of which can result in a restitutionary recovery exceeding expectancy damages. Thus, each could
induce contractual performance where expectancy damages would induce breach.
22. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.9 (2d ed. 1977); Birmingham, Breach of
Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 284 (1970).
23. "Repudiation of obligations should be encouraged where the promisor is able to profit from
his default after placing his promisee in as good a position as he would have occupied had perform-
ance been rendered." Birmingham, supra note 22, at 284.
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increased.2 If, on the other hand, market value restitution is an available
remedy, D may be deterred from breaching. Market value restitution will
be selected by P only if it provides a greater recovery than expectancy
damages. If D's potential restitutionary liability is great enough, she will
be deterred from breach, even though breach is more efficient than
performance.
The economic argument for expectancy damages can be illustrated by
adding one fact to our original Contractor/Owner example. Assume the
following:
Contract Price $50,000
Contractor's estimated costs 40,000
Contractor's true costs 60,000
Contractor's cost incurred in part
performance 48,000
Market value of part performance 64,000
Owner's cost to complete upon breach
(the new fact) 10,000
If Contractor's sole remedy is to recover expectancy damages, Owner
will breach. If Owner breaches, she must pay expectancy damages of
$38,000 (the amount that leaves Contractor with the $10,000 net loss he
would have incurred upon full performance) and must also pay another
contractor $10,000 to get the house completed; thus if Owner breaches,
she can have her house for $48,000. But if Owner performs, she must pay
$50,000 (the contract price) for the house.
If market value restitution is an available remedy for Contractor, Own-
er will perform rather than breach. If Owner breaches, she must pay
Contractor $64,000 as restitution and must also pay another contractor
$10,000 to complete the house, a total of $74,000. If Owner performs, she
need only pay the $50,000 contract price.
In this situation, it is more efficient for Owner to breach and pay ex-
pectancy damages than to perform. In either event, Contractor ends up
with a $10,000 net loss. But Owner saves $2000 by breaching and paying
expectancy damages. The expectancy damages remedy is preferable to
market value restitution because it induces the more efficient use of
resources.
24. The expectancy damages remedy is consistent with a cautious policy of encouraging breach
only when it is certain that breach increases aggregate utility. If, in terms of dollar gains and losses,
breach followed by payment of expectancy damages is advantageous to one party and neither advanta-
geous nor disadvantageous to the other party, then breach increases aggregate utility, regardless of
either party's marginal utility of income curve. The theory of efficient breach assumes that expectancy
damages encourage breach only in such situations.
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B. Relative Efficiency of Expectancy Damages and Market Value Resti-
tution When Transaction Costs Are Considered
The theory of efficient breach ignores certain transaction costs incurred
as a result of a breach of contract. Inasmuch as a winning plaintiff does
not recover attorneys' fees or other litigation expenses and usually does
not receive fully compensatory interest for the delay in recovering dam-
ages, the expectancy remedy does not fully compensate a plaintiff for
losses caused by the defendant's breach.25 The theory of efficient breach
proceeds on the assumption that expectancy damages put plaintiff in the
same economic position as would performance. We must therefore
reevaluate the relative economic efficiency of market value restitution and
expectancy damages, this time considering the effects of breach-related
transaction costs.
Which of these two remedies is more likely to induce D (the party con-
templating breach) to breach when, and only when, breach is efficient? In
assessing the relative economic efficiency of breach and performance, we
shall employ two welfare criteria: Pareto superiority and Kaldor-Hicks
superiority.
An allocation Al of economic resources is Pareto-superior to an alter-
native allocation A2 if and only if Al makes at least one person better off
than A2 does and makes no one worse off than A2 does.2" Thus, a trans-
action involving a $2000 net gain for D and a $500 net gain for P is
Pareto-superior to a transaction involving a $1000 net gain for D and a
$500 net gain for P.
An allocation Al of economic resources is Kaldor-Hicks-superior to an
alternative allocation A2 if and only if the persons made better off by Al
could fully compensate any persons made worse off and still have net
gains in economic welfare.27 Thus, a transaction involving a $2000 net
gain for D and a $500 net gain for P is Kaldor-Hicks-superior (though
not Pareto-superior) to a transaction involving a $1000 net gain for D and
a $1000 net gain for P.
28
25. This has been noted by a number of commentators. See Birmingham, supra note 22, at 285;
Carroll, Four Games and the Expectancy Theory, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 512, 514 (1981); Farber,
Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L.
REV. 1443, 1444, 1450-51 (1980); Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA.
L. REV. 947 (1982); Vernon, Expectancy Damages for Breach of Contract: A Primer and Critique,
1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 179, 186, 202.
26. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 513
(1980); see J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 286 (3d ed. 1980); C. ROWLEY
& A. PEACOCK, WELFARE ECONOMICS 9 (1975); Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange and Auction: Philo-
sophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 221, 226 (1980).
27. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, supra note 26, at 513; see also M.
DOBB, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE ECONOMICS OF SOCIALISM 82-83 (1975) (describing develop-
ment of Kaldor-Hicks test).
28. I follow Richard Posner in applying the Kaldor-Hicks test by comparing gains and losses in
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1. Pareto Superiority
Are there any situations in which a legal rule allowing market value
restitution produces outcomes Pareto-superior to those that would result if
expectancy damages were the only available remedy for breach?
Let us first ask whether there could be a situation in which market
value restitution would induce D to perform, expectancy damages would
induce D to breach, and performance is Pareto-superior to breach with
expectancy damages. Such a situation is impossible. If the use of expec-
tancy damages would induce D to breach, D must be better off breaching
and paying expectancy damages (incurring whatever breach-related trans-
action costs are necessary) than she would be if she performs.29 Since per-
formance would make D worse off, it cannot be Pareto-superior to breach
with expectancy damages.
Let us now ask whether there could be a situation in which market
value restitution would induce D to breach, expectancy damages would
induce D to perform, and breach with market value restitution is Pareto-
superior to performance. The answer is again negative. There is no situa-
tion in which market value restitution would induce D to breach and ex-
pectancy damages would induce D to perform. This would require that
expectancy damages exceed market value restitution, ° in which case P
would not elect restitution.
We thus arrive at Conclusion One: A legal rule allowing market value
restitution will never induce outcomes Pareto-superior to those induced by
a rule allowing only expectancy damages.
wealth, measured in dollar values. See Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm
in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 490-91 (1980). So applied, the Kaldor-
Hicks test is essentially equivalent to Posner's wealth maximization test. Coleman, Efficiency, Ex-
change, and Auction, supra note 26, at 239-42; Posner, supra, at 491. In this form, the Kaldor-Hicks
test avoids the Scitovsky paradox, which arises when a move from allocation Al to allocation A2 is
Kaldor-Hicks efficient, and a move back from A2 to Al is also Kaldor-Hicks efficient. When gains
and losses are measured in dollars, one party's dollar gain in moving from one allocation to the other
is equal to his dollar loss in moving in the opposite direction. Thus, if a move from allocation A2 to
allocation Al gives D a dollar gain exceeding P's dollar loss, a move in the opposite direction cannot
possibly give P a dollar gain exceeding D's dollar loss.
This formulation of the Kaldor-Hicks test, however, suffers from a more serious problem. Because
the test measures gains and losses in dollars, Kaldor-Hicks superiority does not guarantee an increase
in aggregate utility. In the example used in the text, $500 may bring more utility to P than $1000
brings to D. If so, the transaction involving a $2000 net gain for D does not produce greater aggregate
utility, even though it is Kaldor-Hicks-superior to the other transaction. For discussions of the Scitov-
sky paradox and the discrepancy between Kaldor-Hicks superiority and utility maximization, see W.
BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 528-30 (4th ed. 1977); Coleman, Effi-
ciency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, supra note 26, at 518-20.
29. In performing economic analysis, I assume that each party is rational, fully informed as to the
facts and the law, and motivated solely by self-interest.
30. I assume that D's breach-related transaction costs are the same, whichever remedy is granted
to P. If expectancy damages are the only available remedy, it is unlikely that D's litigation expense
will be greater than if P has both remedies available.
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Are there any situations in which a legal rule requiring expectancy
damages produces outcomes Pareto-superior to those that result from a
rule permitting market value restitution?
We shall first ask whether there could be a situation in which expec-
tancy damages would induce D to perform, market value restitution
would induce D to breach, and performance is Pareto-superior to breach
with market value restitution. The answer is negative. As we have already
seen, there is no situation in which expectancy damages would induce D
to perform and market value restitution would induce D to breach. (Fur-
thermore, for restitution to induce D to breach, performance must be
worse for D and thus not Pareto-superior.)
Let us now ask whether there could be a situation in which expectancy
damages would induce D to breach, market value restitution would induce
D to perform, and breach with expectancy damages is Pareto-superior to
performance. Again, the answer is negative. Due to litigation expenses
and other breach-related transaction costs that are not legally compensa-
ble, breach with expectancy damages always makes P worse off than per-
formance."' Such a breach is therefore not Pareto-superior to
performance.
We thus arrive at Conclusion Two: A legal rule allowing only expec-
tancy damages will never induce outcomes Pareto-superior to those in-
duced by a rule allowing market value restitution.
Combining Conclusions One and Two, we get Conclusion Three:
Neither a rule allowing market value restitution as an optional remedy
nor a rule requiring expectancy damages as the only remedy induces out-
comes Pareto-superior to those induced by the other rule.
2. Kaldor-Hicks Superiority
We must now compare market value restitution and expectancy dam-
ages in terms of Kaldor-Hicks superiority. We have already seen that in
no situation would market value restitution induce D to breach while ex-
pectancy damages would induce D to perform. We may therefore confine
our analysis to situations in which market value restitution would induce
D to perform and expectancy damages would induce D to breach.
Are there situations in which market value restitution would induce D
to perform, expectancy damages would induce D to breach, and perform-
ance is Kaldor-Hicks-superior to breach with expectancy damages? Yes,
31. This assumes that D's breach causes loss to P. Expectancy damages do not fully compensate P
for that loss. When D's breach makes P better off than performance would, however, it does not
matter what legal remedies are available. If expectancy damages are the exclusive remedy, D will
breach. If market value restitution is available, P will induce D to breach by promising not to sue for
restitution.
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there are. Consider the following hypothetical in which P, a contractor, is
engaged to build a garage for D:
Contract price for garage (unpaid) $10,000
P's actual costs of full performance 15,000
P's costs incurred in part performance 8,000
Market value of P's part performance 6,000
P's noncompensable transaction costs resulting
from D's breach 3,000
D's costs of obtaining completion from
another contractor 3,000
D's transaction costs resulting from breach 1,500
P's expectancy damages would be $3000 if D breaches when P has
incurred costs of $8000 in partial performance (ignoring P's noncompen-
sable transaction costs, $3000 is the amount necessary to leave P with the
$5000 net loss he would have upon full performance of the contract). If D
breaches and pays expectancy damages, P will suffer an $8000 net loss
($3000 expectancy damages received from D, minus $8000 costs of part
performance, minus $3000 noncompensable transaction costs), and D will
have obtained a garage at a total cost of $7500 ($3000 expectancy dam-
ages paid to P, plus $3000 paid to another contractor, plus $1500 transac-
tion costs). If D performs her contract with P, P will suffer a $5000 net
loss (the difference between $15,000 costs and the $10,000 contract price),
while D will have obtained a garage for $10,000 (the contract price). Per-
formance is Kaldor-Hicks-superior to breach with expectancy damages.
Performance makes P $3000 better off than breach does and makes D
only $2500 worse off. Thus P's incremental gain from performance would
make it possible for P to compensate D for D's incremental loss of $2500
and still retain a $500 net gain.
D will breach if P's only available remedy is expectancy damages;
breach will give D a garage for $7500, whereas peformance would give D
a garage for $10,000. But if P is allowed to choose market value restitu-
tion as an optional remedy, D will perform because breach with restitu-
tion would give D a garage at a cost of $10,500 ($6000 market value
restitution paid to P, plus $3000 paid to another contractor to complete
the garage, plus $1500 transaction costs resulting from breach).
Thus, in this situation, market value restitution would induce D to per-
form, expectancy damages would induce D to breach, and performance is
Kaldor-Hicks-superior to breach with expectancy damages. We thus ar-
rive at Conclusion Four: A legal rule allowing market value restitution
sometimes induces outcomes Kaldor-Hicks-superior to those induced by a
rule allowing only expectancy damages.
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We must now ask whether there are cases in which market value resti-
tution would induce D to perform, expectancy damages would induce D
to breach, and breach with expectancy damages is Kaldor-Hicks-superior
to performance. There are. Consider the following variation of the previ-
ous hypothetical:
Contract price for garage (unpaid) $10,000
P's actual costs of full performance 15,000
P's costs incurred in part performance 8,000
Market value of P's part performance 8,000
P's noncompensable transaction costs
resulting from D's breach 500
D's cost of obtaining completion from
another contractor 1,500
D's transaction costs resulting from breach 1,000
As in the previous hypothetical, P's expectancy is a $5000 net loss, and if
D breaches when P has incurred costs of $8000 in partial performance,
P's expectancy damages would be $3000. Thus, if D breaches and pays
expectancy damages, she ends up with a garage costing $5500 ($3000 ex-
pectancy damages paid to P, plus $1500 paid to another contractor to
complete the garage, plus $1000 transaction costs). P ends up with a
$5500 net loss ($3000 expectancy damages received, minus $8000 cost of
part performance, minus $500 noncompensable transaction costs). If D
performs her contract with P, P will end up with a $5000 net loss, and D
will have a garage costing $10,000. In this situation, breach with expec-
tancy damages is Kaldor-Hicks-superior to performance. Breach makes D
$4500 better off than performance and makes P only $500 worse off. D's
incremental gain from breach is greater than the amount required to com-
pensate P for his incremental loss.
We can also see that D will breach if expectancy damages are P's only
remedy, since breach gives D a garage for $5500, whereas performance
would give her a garage for $10,000. If P is allowed to choose market
value restitution as a remedy, however, D will perform; the market value
of P's part performance is $8000, and breach with restitution would re-
sult in D's acquiring a garage costing $10,500 ($8000 market value resti-
tution paid to P, plus $1500 paid to another contractor to complete the
garage, plus $1000 transaction costs resulting from breach).
In this situation, then, market value restitution would induce D to per-
form, expectancy damages would induce D to breach, and breach with
expectancy damages is Kaldor-Hicks-superior to performance."2 We thus
32. If negotiation costs are low enough, P and D can negotiate a mutually advantageous cancella-
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arrive at Conclusion Five: A legal rule allowing only expectancy damages
sometimes induces outcomes Kaldor-Hicks-superior to those induced by a
rule allowing market value restitution.
Combining Conclusions Four and Five, we get Conclusion Six: Under
the criterion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, a rule allowing market value res-
titution is preferable in some situations, while a rule allowing only expec-
tancy damages is preferable in others.
C. The Inconclusiveness of Economic Analysis
We have inquired whether expectancy damages are really preferable to
market value restitution when transaction costs are considered. In view of
Conclusions Three and Six, it appears that economic analysis fails to
show that either is preferable, whether we use the Pareto or the Kaldor-
Hicks standard of efficiency. 3 The issue, therefore, must be resolved by
means of noneconomic principles of justice.
tion of the contract, and the availability of market value restitution will not induce D to perform. Cf
Clarkson, Miller & Muris, Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense?, 1978 WIS. L. REV.
351, 360-62; Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle:
Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554,
567-68, 587 (1977) (suggesting that if nonperformance is efficient, parties can negotiate out of a
stipulated damages clause that would deter breach). See generally Coase, The Problem of Social Cost,
3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-16 (1960) (arguing that in the absence of transaction costs, persons with conflict-
ing economic interests can bargain to efficient outcomes, regardless of their legal rights and liabilities).
Assuming that negotiation costs are negligible, D would be willing to pay P any amount up to $8500
to cancel the contract ($8500 plus the $1500 cost of obtaining completion from another contractor
equals the $10,000 contract price D would pay if the contract were performed). P would accept any
amount exceeding $3000 ($3000 gives P the $5000 net loss he would derive from contract
performance).
Similarly, in the previous hypothetical, the availability of market value restitution will not induce D
to perform, so long as negotiation costs are low enough to permit D and P to negotiate a mutually
advantageous cancellation. Assuming that negotiation costs are negligible, D would be willing to pay
P any amount up to $7000 to cancel the contract ($7000 plus the $3000 cost of obtaining completion
from another contractor equals the $10,000 contract price D would pay if the contract were per-
formed). P would accept any amount exceeding $3000 ($3000 gives P the $5000 net loss he would
derive from contract performance).
It is thus possible that in these two hypothetical situations the availability of market value restitu-
tion would not result in the performance of contracts that would otherwise go unperformed. In such
cases, the availability of market value restitution would not affect economic efficiency.
33. Robert Birmingham recognizes that expectancy damages are undercompensatory and thus fail
to achieve the efficient results indicated by the theory of efficient breach. He argues, however, that
instead of abandoning the expectancy measure, the legal system should make the breaching party bear
the other party's transaction costs caused by the breach. Birmingham, supra note 22, at 285. Never-
theless, the general rule that each party must bear his own litigation expense will probably persist
(although exceptions have been carved out by consumer protection statutes) and should be taken as a
"given" when trying to decide whether a partially performing seller should be allowed to select mar-
ket value restitution as an optional remedy.
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III. The Liberal Argument Against Money Restitution As a Remedy for
Partially Performing Sellers
Basic liberal principles of justice imply that money restitution is an im-
proper remedy for breach when the plaintiff is a seller who has partially
performed. 34 In this case, restitution interferes unnecessarily with the lib-
erty of the parties.
A. Protection of Liberty as a Goal of the Legal System: The Principle of
Minimal Coercion
According to the liberal view, a legal system should prevent, or at least
minimize, harmful invasions of the liberty35 of any citizen.36 In particular,
the legal system should protect each citizen's liberty to dispose of his prop-
erty and labor only as he consents.37 As the liberal sees it, however, liberty
is not the only end of the legal system. Other goals must be considered in
resolving conflicts among particular liberties, and in certain situations the
law may give such goals higher priority than liberty. 8
Consider the situation in which A's liberty to do x is incompatible with
B's liberty to do y. The legal system must rank these conflicting liberties,
34. As the term is used here, a liberal is one who assigns a high value to personal liberty. Liberal
theories share certain core concepts: government should be neutral as to what constitutes the good life,
treating with equal respect each individual's self-chosen ends; government should guarantee the condi-
tions necessary for the development and exercise of personAl autonomy, leaving each individual free to
pursue his own life plan as long as he allows others a similar freedom. See B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL
JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10-12, 346-48 (1980); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
272-73 (1977); C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 7 (1981); Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE MORALITY 113, 127 (S. Hampshire ed. 1978); Richards, Rights and Autonomy, 92 ETHICS
3, 6-9, 17 (1981). Liberals disagree as to the conditions necessary for personal autonomy and thus
disagree over the proper extent of governmental intervention. Libertarian liberals oppose governnen-
tal coercion except when necessary to protect citizens from forceful or fraudulent aggression against
person or property; extensive inequality of wealth is justified as long as it results from transactions
involving mutual consent. See, e.g., J. LOCKE, Second Treatise of Civil Government, in TREATISE OF
CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETI'ER CONCERNING TOLERATION (C. Sherman ed. 1937); R. NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). Egalitarian liberals, on the other hand, believe that some
rough equality of economic resources and opportunities is necessary for personal autonomy; they thus
favor considerable state intervention in economic relationships and substantial redistribution of wealth.
See, e.g., C. BECKER, MODERN DEMOCRACY (1941); Dworkin, Liberalism, supra, at 128-33; Reiman,
The Fallacy of Libertarian Capitalism, 92 ETHICS 85 (1981).
35. As the term is used here, "liberty" is the absence of deliberate forceful interference in the
affairs of one person by another. See I. BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 122 (1969); J. FEINBERG,
SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 7 (1973). Liberals argue that liberty should be protected whenever doing so does
not frustrate the pursuit of values with higher priority. Whenever one loses some liberty, one loses
something of value. See M. BAYLES, PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATION 78 (1978); J. FEINBERG, supra, at
21.
36. According to Locke, the purpose of law "is . . . to preserve and enlarge freedom. For...
where there is no law there is no freedom. For liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from
others; which cannot be where there is no law . . . ." J. LOCKE, supra note 34, § 57, at 36-37.
37. This notion is expressed in Nozick's maxim of justice in transfers: "From each as they choose,
to each as they are chosen." R. NOZICK, supra note 34, at 160.
38. Liberals disagree as to which goals, if any, take priority over liberty. For purposes of my
argument, however, it is not necessary to resolve this issue.
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assigning priority by weighing all the interests involved, not just the inter-
est in liberty. If it is decided that B's liberty to do y has priority, the legal
system will coerce A, depriving him of his liberty to do x, in order to
protect B's liberty to do y. Liberties that get priority are called legal
"rights"; conduct that is an interference with such a right is a legal
"wrong." Coercion by the legal system, in the form of a court judgment
that can be enforced by state action, is an interference with the liberty of
one of the parties, but is justified, under the liberal view, if it protects a
higher-priority liberty of the other party. 9
In the original hypothetical involving Contractor and Owner, Contrac-
tor's liberty to dispose of his property and labor only as he consents is
incompatible with Owner's liberty to perform or breach the contract as
she pleases. Contractor has consented to build a house on the condition
that Owner pay him $50,000. Contractor has not consented to any other
transfer of property or labor. When Owner obtains part of a house from
Contractor and pays nothing for it, she forces Contractor into a transfer to
which he never consented. Owner's breach is a harmful interference with
Contractor's liberty.
Contractor's liberty is given priority over Owner's liberty because Own-
er's breach not only causes a private harm to Contractor, but also causes a
public harm: it makes Contractor, and others who learn of Owner's
breach, less willing to enter into contracts and thus impairs the social
practice of contracting for mutually beneficial exchange. Protecting Con-
tractor's liberty entails state interference with Owner's liberty (a private
harm) but does not cause any public harm; it reinforces, rather than im-
pairs, the social practice of contracting. Thus, the liberal legal system rec-
ognizes Owner's breach as a legal wrong and imposes on Owner some
form of liability designed to rectify her interference with Contractor's
liberty.
The goal of protecting liberty, however, acts as a constraint on the lia-
bility imposed by a liberal system. In protecting B's liberty (or some other
interest of B), the legal system should interfere with A's liberty only to the
extent necessary to rectify A's harmful interference with B's liberty and to
realize any other purpose for giving B's interests priority over A's. This
principle will be referred to as the "Principle of Minimal Coercion."'4
39. See J. FEINBERG, supra note 35, at 23-24; A. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 326-27
(1978); 1. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 35-36 (J. Ladd trans. 1965).
40. The Principle of Minimial Coercion is derived from the notion that any particular liberty is
valuable, supra note 35, and thus should be infringed only to the extent necessary to promote higher-
priority liberties or other higher-priority values. In our hypothetical, Owner's liberty to breach has a
lower priority than the combination of Contractor's liberty and the need to reinforce the social prac-
tice of contracting. But Owner's liability should not exceed the amount necessary to realize these
higher-priority values.
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B. Measuring Liability: The Principle of Causal Responsibility
Defendant's harmful interference with plaintiff's liberty can be rectified
by making defendant liable for a sum that compensates plaintiff for the
harm caused by defendant's interference. This suggests that when breach
of contract is a harmful interference with liberty, the breaching party
should be liable only for harm caused by her breach.41 Reinforcing the
social practice of contracting, however, may require supercompensatory'2
liability to adequately deter contract breaches.' 3
Deterrence provides the only legitimate reason for making the breach-
ing party's liability exceed the amount needed to compensate plaintiff for
the harm done. In particular, deterrence provides the only legitimate rea-
son for making the breaching party compensate plaintiff for losses not
caused by the breach. Even if some other goal (equality, for example)
were given priority over liberty, that other goal could not justify making a
defendant liable (as a defendant) for a loss she had not caused. There may
be good reasons to make the defendant (as a participant in a social prac-
tice) bear part of such a loss, but even then, that loss would not be allo-
cated by means of contract law or other rectifying law such as tort or
restitution. Instead, the legal system should use some broader redistribu-
tive scheme that considers a large number of citizens as potential loss-
sharers." If A has not caused B's loss, a good reason is required for mak-
The notion that the legal system should minimize coercion is prevalent in liberal theory. See, e.g.,
F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 20-21, 133-47 (1960); J. LOCKE, supra note 34, § 159, at
108-09; J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 116 (C. Shields ed. 1956); R. TAYLOR, FREEDOM, ANARCHY, AND
THE LAW 61 (1973).
41. It has been observed that "causal connexion is very generally required as a ground of liabil-
ity." H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 125 (1959). In tort law, even those
who advocate replacing negligence liability with strict liability would limit the defendant's liability to
harms she has caused. See Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 203-04
(1973).
Nozick suggests that rectification of a transfer effected without the transferor's consent presumably
requires both an estimate about what would have happened had the injustice not taken place and an
attempt to realize such an outcome. R. NOZICK, supra note 34, at 152-53. This suggests that a defen-
dant should be forced to pay plaintiff only enough to compensate plaintiff for the harm caused by
defendant's wrong.
42. By "supercompensatory," I mean liability exceeding what is necessary to compensate plaintiff
for harm caused by defendant's wrong.
43. The need to deter breach of contract is also implicit in the legal system's goal of protecting
personal liberty. Many breaches involve harmful interference with the aggrieved party's liberty.
44. Aristotle's distinction between distributive justice and rectificatory justice is relevant and help-
ful. Distributive justice involves the distribution of honors and wealth among all citizens according to
their relative deserts. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 117-20 (bk. V, chs. 2, 3) (M. Ostwald
trans. 1962). In contrast, the concept of rectificatory justice applies to private transactions. In remedy-
ing an involuntary and unjust transfer, the judge should rectify the consequences of the wrong. Id. at
120-23 (bk. V, ch. 4). If D has breached a contract partially performed by P (as in our Contractor-
Owner hypothetical), Artistotle's notion of rectificatory justice seems to call for rectification of P's
involuntary transfer; D should be liable for P's loss caused by the breach. P might be entitled to
compensation for other losses as a matter of distributive justice (depending upon how "desert" is
defined), but the burden of any such redistribution would presumably be shared by all (or at least
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ing A bear part of that loss, some reason other than causal responsibility.
Whatever that reason, it undoubtedly would apply to other citizens as
well. Making A liable for a loss she has not caused is unjustly discrimina-
tory; it imposes the entire loss on only one of the many persons who ought
to bear it. 5
Nor is supercompensatory liability justified as an attempt to prevent
unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment is enrichment at another person's
expense, enrichment through another person's loss. 46 D's enrichment is
unjust only to the extent that it involves P's unjust deprivation, that is,
only to the extent that D obtains something to which P is entitled by
virtue of a better claim. If D wrongfully appropriates P's property, D's
enrichment is unjust only to the extent of P's loss, and D's liability should
not exceed the amount needed to compensate P for that loss.
47
The liberal Principle of Minimal Coercion thus leads to the following
conclusion: Defendant's liability should not exceed the harm caused by
her wrong, unless greater liability is required for purposes of deterrence.
This conclusion will be referred to as the "Principle of Causal Responsi-
bility." In the liberal view, it applies whenever defendant's wrongful in-
terference with plaintiff's liberty leads the legal system to interfere with




45. See C. FRIED, supra note 34, at 103-06 (arguing that unconscionability doctrine should not be
used to impose redistributive burdens on those who happen to contract with persons poorer than
themselves); Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 502-03 (1980)
(evaluating relative merits of taxation and regulation of contracts by extent to which they "consider
how broadly the burdens of redistribution are spread").
46. J. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 3, 5, 6, 8, 150-51 (1951); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION
§ 1 & comment c (1936); Dawson, Restitution Without Enrichment, 61 B.U.L. REV. 563, 565, 620,
621 (1981); Dawson, Restitution or Damages?, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 176-77 (1959).
47. Assume that the market value of the property in P's hands was $10,000, and that D in some
way converts it into property having a market value of $20,000. Any increase in value is either (i)
attributable to the appropriated property itself and to opportunities available to P had he not been
deprived of the property, or (ii) attributable to D's effort and skill and to opportunities not available
to P had he been allowed to retain the property. See D. DOBBS, supra note 8, § 4.3, at 242-44, § 4.5,
at 273; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 151 comment c, § 154 comment a (1936). P has been
unjustly deprived of $10,000 plus whatever portion of the increased value falls within category (i).
This is the amount of D's unjust enrichment. It is no coincidence that this is also the amount required
to compensate P for his lost property and his lost opportunities, his losses caused by D's wrong. If P
recovers any portion of the increase falling within category (ii), it is not on the ground of unjust
enrichment; such a supercompensatory recovery can be justified only by the need for deterrence.
It is often said that restitution deprives defendant of her unjust enrichment and thus sometimes
gives plaintiff more than he had lost. This view seems to assume that plaintiff lost only the market
value as of the time of defendant's misappropriation; it seems to ignore the possibility that restitution
also compensates plaintiff for opportunities lost because of defendant's misappropriation.
In the Restatement of Restitution, a policy of deterrence lies behind the use of different rules for
conscious wrongdoers and innocent defendants and the imposition of supercompensatory liability upon
the former. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 202 comment c, § 203 comment a (1936).
48. The Principle of Causal Responsibility is so widely accepted that we seldom bother to state it,
much less defend it. The principle can be found in Locke's discussion of the natural law that "no one
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C. Measuring Liability: The Principle of Consent
The Principle of Causal Responsibility limits liability when the legal
system coerces a defendant to do something she has not consented to do. It
does not, however, apply when the legal system forces a defendant to do
something she has previously consented to do, at least not where the prior
consent was contractual.'
The liberal view not only recognizes contractual consent, it regards it as
irrevocably binding. In the social practice of contracting, promissory con-
sent involves a commitment to put some portion of one's resources at the
disposal of the promisee at some specified time. Such consent is treated as
irrevocable because it induces expectation and reliance. The efficacy of the
social practice depends upon the irrevocability of consent.50
We thus arrive at the following liberal principle: The legal system does
not interfere with a defendant's liberty if the liability imposed on a defen-
dant forces her to do something she has contractually consented to do."'
This principle will be referred to as the "Principle of Consent." When the
Principle of Consent applies, the Principle of Causal Responsibility does
ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions." J. LOCKE, supra note 34, § 6, at 6.
Those who transgress this law may be punished only to the degree necessary for "reparation" (satis-
faction or compensation for the harm suffered) and "restraint" (hindrance or deterrence of such viola-
tions). Id. §§ 7-10, at 7-9. "For these two are the only reasons why one man may lawfully do harm to
another." Id. § 8, at 7.
49. A liberal legal system seeks to protect personal liberty from harmful interference, but it also
permits cooperative interaction among persons. To distinguish cooperative interaction from interfer-
ence with liberty, liberals employ the notion of consent. When A takes B's lawnmower from B's
garage and uses it to cut his own grass, A does not interfere with B's liberty if B has consented to A's
use of the lawnmower. Without some notion of consent as a defense, any use of another person's
resources would run the risk of being declared a legal wrong, unless there were an extensive (and
excessively rigid) set of rules specifying wrongful uses. Such a scheme would not be very conducive to
cooperative interaction. It is more convenient to stipulate that A does not interfere with B's liberty
when A does something with B's consent. B's consent thus negates A's tort. Cf W. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 18, at 101 (4th ed. 1971) (describing tort doctrine of volenti non fit
injuria-to one who is willing, no wrong is done).
50. Thus, if D on May I contractually consents to pay P $1000 on November 1, and then on
November 1 refuses to pay, her May consent remains operative despite the November repudiation.
When the legal system forces D to pay Pthe $1000, it does not, according to the liberal, interfere with
Ds liberty because it is taking D's money with her consent. Indeed, there is only an illusion of
consent if the commitment is revocable. "For to consent to be tied no further than a person agrees to
at some future time is not to consent to anything at all." P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREE-
DOM OF CONTRACT 51 (1979) (summarizing Locke's notion of consent).
51. An exception may be appropriate when defendant has contracted to perform personal services
and a specific performance decree is regarded as an undue interference with her liberty. We need not
resolve this issue, however, for purposes of this Article, which deals only with restitution of money or
specific property.
A Kantian version of the principle stated in the text is presented in C. FRIED, supra note 34, at 13-
14, 18-21. Fried suggests that the legal system must enforce defendant's contractual consent in order
to treat her as a free and rational person and enhance her freedom by giving her will the greatest
possible range consistent with the will of others. But see B. ACKERMAN, supra note 34, at 196-99
(suggesting that no convincing argument can be made for the view that contractual consent is always
binding).
The Yale Law Journal
not come into play; the latter principle limits liability only when the legal
system interferes with a defendant's liberty.
D. Liberal Liability Principles and Buyer's Breach When the Seller
Has Partially Performed
Let us now apply these liberal principles of liability in the hypothetical
involving Contractor and Owner. Owner's breach subjected Contractor to
an involuntary transfer of property and labor. If Owner had agreed to pay
a price for Contractor's partial performance, Owner could be held liable
for that price under the Principle of Consent and coercion would therefore
not be necessary. But Owner has not agreed to pay any particular price
for Contractor's partial performance. Owner agreed to pay $50,000 for a
complete house, not $40,000 (or any other amount) for four-fifths of a
house. Under the liberal view, the legal system may justifiably coerce
Owner to protect Contractor's higher-priority liberty. It is not feasible for
Owner to return Contractor's partial performance in specie, and so Own-
er must be liable for an amount she has not previously consented to pay.
There must therefore be a forced exchange, an interference with Owner's
liberty.
The Principle of Causal Responsibility then comes into play. Upon
Owner's breach, Contractor has a net loss of $48,000 (Contractor's costs
incurred in part performance for which he has been paid nothing). If
Owner had performed, Contractor would have incurred a net loss of
$10,000 (the difference between his $60,000 total costs and the $50,000
contract price). Owner's breach has therefore caused a loss of $38,000.
The remaining $10,000 loss would have occurred in the absence of any
breach; Owner's breach was not a cause of the loss because it was not a
necessary condition for that loss. 52 Thus, under the liberal view, Owner's
52. A wrongful act or omission is not a legal cause of a loss if it is not a necessary condition for
that loss. See D. DOBBS, supra note 8, § 3.3, at 148-50; W. PROSSER, supra note 49, § 41. A is a
necessary condition for B if A is a member of the set of conditions that actually occurred and that
were individually necessary and jointly sufficient for B. See Taylor, Causation, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 56, 62-63 (1967). Thus, A is a necesssary condition for B if B would not have occurred
in the absence of A, given the conditions that did exist and ignoring conditions that did not exist. A
necessary condition may be referred to as a "necessary cause" or a "but for cause" or a "cause in fact"
or a "cause sine qua non."
A legal cause ("proximate cause" or "responsible cause") is a human act or omission that is a
necessary condition and that is distinguishable from other necessary conditions by virtue of being
conspicuously relevant to the policy purpose of the inquiry as to causation and responsibility. See
H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORA, supra note 41, 79-102, 104; W. PROSSER, supra note 49, § 42. We
need not deal with the perplexing question of what constitutes legal cause, since a breach of contract
cannot be a legal cause of a loss if it is not even a necessary condition for that loss.
There are exceptional situations in which a legal cause is not a necessary condition. These situa-
tions involve two concurrent causes, each of which would have been sufficient to produce the harm in
the absence of the other (for example, two men simultaneously fire bullets into their victim's brain).
See D. DOBBS, supra note 8, § 3.3, at 149-50; H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORt, supra note 41, at 116-
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liability should not exceed the $38,000 expectancy damages, unless greater
liability is required for purposes of deterrence.
Assume, for the sake of argument, that expectancy damages do not pro-
vide adequate deterrence to breach. Perhaps the general deterrence level is
too low; that is, too few contracts are performed and too many are
breached. There may also be specific types of breach (for example,
breaches that threaten to drive the aggrieved party out of business) that
call for greater deterrence than expectancy damages provide. The availa-
bility of restitution as an optional remedy for breach provides additional
deterrence in situations in which restitutionary liability exceeds expec-
tancy damages. But restitution seems an inappropriate method for achiev-
ing the desired deterrence.
First, the additional deterrence achieved by giving plaintiff a choice be-
tween expectancy damages and market value restitution is slight.5" Mar-
ket value restitution affords additional deterrence only when buyer knows
that the market value of seller's partial performance will exceed seller's
expectancy damages for breach. This is probably met only in a small frac-
tion of the transactions that require greater deterrence against breach.
Second, market value restitution will almost always either overdeter or
underdeter. The market value of seller's partial performance is unrelated
to the level of liability needed to effect optimal deterrence (whatever that
level is). Only as a rare coincidence will market value restitution impose
liability at or near the optimal level for deterrence.
If expectancy damages do not provide adequate deterrence, punitive
damages offer a better corrective than does restitution. Indeed, deterrence
is a principal purpose of punitive damages. 4 Unlike restitution, punitive
damages can be tailored to produce a given level of deterrence. Although
courts have been reluctant to award punitive damages in breach of con-
tract actions, there is a recent trend toward a more liberal and flexible use
of this remedy.55
19, 216-25; W. PROSSER, supra note 49, § 41, at 239-40. Owner's breach of contract, however, is not
such a cause with respect to Contractor's $10,000 loss. Although that loss would have occurred even if
the contract had been performed, we cannot say that Owner's breach would have been sufficient to
cause that loss in the absence of Contractor's underestimation of his costs.
53. I assume that restitution would be measured by the market value of seller's partial perfor-
mance; this is the measure favored by the courts. See supra p. 18. As a deterrent, each of the other
measures of monetary restitution suffers from the same defects: additional deterrence is provided only
when restitutionary liability exceeds expectancy damages, and restitution usually overdeters or
underdeters.
54. See, e.g., Miller v. Elite Ins. Co., 100 Cal. App. 3d 739, 759-60, 161 Cal. Rptr. 322, 333-34
(1980); Traylor v. Wachter, 227 Kan. 221, 224, 607 P.2d 1094, 1098 (1980); Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1
N.J.L. 77 (Sup. Ct. 1791); Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314, 328 (Utah 1979); C.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 77, at 275-76 (1935); Note, Punitive Dam-
ages in Contract Actions-Are the Exceptions Swallowing the Rule?, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 86, 88
(1980).
55. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 578-81, 510 P.2d 1032, 1040-42, 108
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We must conclude that, under the liberal view, money restitution
should be abandoned as a remedy for breach of contract when plaintiff is
a seller who has partially performed; such a plaintiff should be limited to
his expectancy damages. 56  Restitition either violates the Principle of
Causal Responsibility (when the restitutionary award exceeds plaintiff's
expectancy damages) or is an unnecessary remedy (when the restitution-
ary amount does not exceed plaintiff's expectancy damages).
IV. Liberal Principles in the Law of Restitution
Courts grant restitution in a variety of situations, some of which do not
involve breach of contract. A survey of the case law of restitution reveals a
general pattern consistent with the liberal principles discussed above and
highlights the anomaly of money restitution in the case of the partially
performing seller when buyer has breached.
A. Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract When Plaintiff Is a
Buyer
If plaintiff is a buyer who has paid all or part of the contract price
when the seller breaches, plaintiff recovers his money, even if this makes
him better off than contract performance would have.5" Although defen-
dant may be forced to pay more than would be necessary to compensate
plaintiff for losses caused by her breach, full restitution of plaintiff's pay-
ment is justified by the Principle of Consent: the legal system does not
interfere with defendant's liberty when it forces her to do something she
has contractually consented to do. When the contract was formed, plaintiff
buyer agreed to pay the contract price only on the condition (implied, if
not expressed) that seller deliver the specified property or services. In ac-
cepting these terms, defendant seller agreed not to keep buyer's money if
Cal. Rptr. 480, 488-90 (1973); Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902, 907, 453 P.2d 551, 556
(1969); Vernon Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 316 N.E.2d 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974), modified on
other grounds, 349 N.E.2d 173 (Ind. 1976); Holmes, Is There Life After Gilmore's Death of Con-
tract?-Inductions from a Study of Commercial Good Faith in First-Party Insurance Contracts, 65
CORNELL L. REV. 330 (1980); Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The Reality and
the Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REV. 207 (1977); Note, supra note 54.
56. Expectancy damages are not fully compensatory inasmuch as they do not compensate plaintiff
for litigation expenses and other transaction costs incurred as a result of defendant's breach. See supra
p. 24. Such compensation could be awarded by expanding the scope of expectancy damages or by
utilizing punitive damages. Either method would be preferable to restitution, which provides compen-
sation only as a rare coincidence.
57. See supra note 4. Assume that buyer has agreed to pay a contract price of $10,000 and has
already paid this amount when seller breaches. Seller has not delivered any of the property or services
contracted for. At the time of seller's breach, the market price has dropped to $5000. Full restitution
of buyer's $10,000 payment enables buyer to obtain for $5000 something for which he had contracted
to pay $10,000.
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she could not deliver the specified property or services.5"
B. Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract When Plaintiff Is a
Seller
If a plaintiff seller has partially performed when buyer breaches, and
the partial performance can be returned in specie, the court may award
specific restitution." Specific restitution on behalf of a seller plaintiff is
similar to restitution of money paid by a buyer plaintiff. In both cases, the
restitution rectifies an involuntary transfer and is justified under the Prin-
ciple of Consent.60
If plaintiff seller has completely performed, and defendant buyer owes
only a liquidated debt, plaintiff cannot obtain restitution as a remedy for
defendant's breach. 1 Plaintiff is limited to an action for the unpaid con-
tract price and can therefore recover only his expectancy. Money restitu-
tion exceeding the contract price would violate the Principle of Causal
Responsibility by interfering with defendant's liberty beyond the extent
necessary to compensate plaintiff for loss caused by the breach.62 Such
restitution would not be justified by the Principle of Consent (as an action
for the price would be), because it would force defendant to pay more
than she had contractually consented to pay.
Courts fashion only one restitutionary remedy for buyer's breach that is
inconsistent with liberal principles: money value restitution in the case of
a partially performing seller. As explained above, this remedy is not justi-
fied under the Principle of Consent and it violates the Principle of Causal
Responsibility.
C. Restitution in Favor of a Party in Breach of Contract
The courts are divided on the question of whether, and how much,
restitution should be granted for partial performance by a party in breach
of contract. For example, in construction contract cases, if the contractor
58. 1 have assumed that plaintiff buyer has not received any performance from seller. If buyer has
received some performance, he must return it (or its value) to obtain restitution of his money payment.
See supra note 2.
59. See supra note 6.
60. The seller plaintiff has agreed to deliver certain property only on the condition that buyer pay
the contract price; seller has not agreed to deliver part of his performance for nothing. In accepting
seller's terms, buyer has agreed not to keep seller's performance while paying nothing in return.
61. See supra note 5.
62. Specific restitution would be permitted under the Principle of Consent, but it is not normally
granted when seller has fully performed. The full performance rule, however, may not always be the
reason for denying specific restitution. For example, courts may be reluctant to make a fee simple
defeasible or provide a security interest not bargained for. 1 G. PALMER, supra note 2, § 4.3, at 383-
84, § 4.7(a), § 4.16, at 499-500, § 4.19.
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has committed a material breach,"3 and the owner is not in breach, some
courts deny restitution altogether,64 thereby subjecting the contractor to an
involuntary transfer of property and labor. This result is inconsistent with
liberal principles. Total forfeiture violates the Principle of Minimal Coer-
cion because it interferes with the contractor's liberty beyond the point
necessary to protect the owner's expectancy.
Some courts grant restitution, awarding the breaching contractor the
lesser of two amounts: (i) the unpaid contract price minus owner's dam-
ages for breach; or (ii) the net increase in owner's wealth attributed to
contractor's partial performance.6 5 Limiting contractor's restitution to the
unpaid contract price minus owner's damages for breach ensures that
Owner at least gets her expectancy. Owner obtains more than her expec-
tancy, however, if the net increase in her wealth is less than the unpaid
contract price minus her damages for breach. This seems inconsistent with
the Principle of Minimal Coercion, since contractor may be subjected to
an involuntary transfer exceeding that necessary to protect owner's
expectancy.
Some courts have measured the breaching contractor's restitution with-
out any ceiling imposed by owner's net gain; the contractor simply recov-
ers the unpaid contract price minus owner's damages for breach. 6 Such a
remedy ensures that the owner obtains her expectancy, but it may force
the owner to pay restitution exceeding the amount necessary to rectify
contractor's involuntary transfer, a violation of the Principle of Minimal
Coercion.67
The Principle of Minimal Coercion seems to require restitution in an
63. If the breach is not "material" and the contractor has thus "substantially" performed, he
cannot obtain restitution. He is subject to the rule that precludes a fully performing seller from ob-
taining restitution when buyer owes only a liquidated sum of money. Id. § 5.2. The Contractor,
however, may enforce the contract and recover the unpaid contract price minus owner's damages for
breach. Id. §§ 5.2, 5.14(a).
64. See, e.g., Miller v. Yockey, 49 Colo. 303, 112 P. 772 (1911); Faxon v. Mansfield, 2 Mass.
147 (1806).
65. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Arlmont Air Condition Corp. v. Premier Contractors, Inc., 283
F. Supp. 343 (D. Me. 1968); 1 G. PALMER, supra note 2, §§ 5.3, 5.14(e); RESTATEMENT, supra note
1, § 357 illustration 3.
66. See, e.g., Pinches v. Swedish Evangelical Lutheran Church, 55 Conn. 183, 10 A. 264 (1887);
Blakeslee v. Holt, 42 Conn. 226, 229 (1875).
67. Assume the following. The contract price is $100,000. Contractor partially performs and then
breaches. He has incurred costs of $45,000 in partial performance; full performance would have cost
him an additional $45,000. Owner pays another contractor $40,000 to complete the structure; the
completed structure enhances the market value of owner's real estate by $80,000.
If owner pays restitution of $60,000 ($100,000 unpaid contract price minus $40,000 damages for
breach), owner obtains her expectancy (she has the complete structure for a total cost of $100,000),
but she has paid contractor more than enough to prevent contractor's involuntary transfer. Contractor
voluntarily agreed to transfer his labor and property for compensation that would yield a $10,000 net
profit. If he receives restitution of $60,000, he obtains a net profit of $15,000 (despite the fact that he
has only partially performed).
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amount equal to the lesser of (i) a pro rata portion of the contract price,
using the ratio that contractor's incurred costs bear to his costs for full
performance, (ii) the amount that gives contractor his expectancy, and (iii)
the amount that leaves owner with her expectancy. " Because of the need
to reinforce the social practice of contracting, owner's right to obtain her
expectancy takes priority over the breaching contractor's desire to avoid an
involuntary transfer. As long as owner obtains her expectancy, contractor
should be compensated for partial performance at the contract rate, the
rate at which contractor agreed to transfer his labor and property and
thus the compensatory rate at which the transfer might be regarded as
voluntary. Contractor should not, under the liberal view, recover restitu-
tion that makes him better off than full performance would; if he agreed
to an exchange that would have left him with a net loss, that loss should
be regarded as voluntary.
D. Restitution When Performance of a Contract Is Excused by Impossi-
bility, Impracticability, or Frustration of Purpose
If one party is excused from performance of a contract on the ground of
impossibility, impracticability, or frustration of purpose, both parties are
discharged from any duty of further performance, and any partial per-
formance by either party is "restored" by way of restitution. 9 In measur-
ing money restitution for a partially performing seller, the prevailing
practice is to make use of the contract terms and award a pro rata portion
of the contract price, using the ratio that the value of seller's partial per-
formance bears to the value of his promised performance.7" This compen-
sates the seller at the agreed upon exchange rate; it thus gives him the
advantage (or disadvantage) of his bargain, but only for the portion of the
contract that has been performed.
Restitution measured by the pro rata formula is consistent with the
Principle of Minimal Coercion. Some restitution is necessary to avoid
seller's involuntary transfer of wealth."1 Assuming that seller is the party
68. In the hypothetical presented supra note 67, restitution of $50,000 would give contractor the
pro rata portion of the contract price he has earned on the basis of costs incurred. Restitution of
$55,000 would give contractor his expectancy (assuming that his breach did not enable contractor to
redirect his resources to another revenue-producing project). Restitution of $60,000 leaves owner with
her expectancy. Under the method proposed in the text, owner should pay the breaching contractor
$50,000.
69. E.g., Butterfield v. Byron, 153 Mass. 517, 27 N.E. 667 (1891); Wolfe v. Howes, 20 N.Y. 197
(1859); 2 G. PALMER, supra note 2, § 7.1.
70. E.g., Dame v. Wood, 75 N.H. 38, 70 A. 1081 (1908); Weis v. Devlin, 67 Tex. 507, 3 S.W.
726 (1887); 2 G. PALMER, supra note 2, §§ 7.5, 7.7(a), 7.8(b); see U.C.C. §§ 2-607(1), 2-613(b)
(1977).
71. Pro rata restitution is designed to prevent unjust deprivation and not unjust enrichment. See
Dawson, Restitution Without Enrichment, supra note 46, at 585-92. The amount of restitution is not
measured by the net increase in buyer's wealth, but by the value seller has lost (measured at the rate
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excused by reason of intervening burden, the need to relieve seller from
this burden overcomes the need to protect buyer's expectancy and justifies
giving the seller something better than his expectancy. Assuming that
seller's partial performance cannot be returned in specie, it is thus proper,
under liberal principles, to measure seller's restitution by the contract rate
derived from the valid consensual agreement of the parties."2 Although
pro rata restitution imposes a forced exchange upon the buyer (who never
consented to pay a particular price for partial performance), it comes close
to the parties' contractual consent and therefore minimizes the extent to
which either party is coerced. The innocent buyer is not assured of ob-
taining her expectancy (as she would be if seller were in breach); nonethe-
less, she may not suffer a net loss.7
3
E. Restitution When a Contract Is Unenforceable Under the Statute of
Frauds
When an oral contract is unenforceable because of the statute of frauds,
a party who has rendered some performance and has not breached the
contract 7' can obtain restitution.7 5 Restoration of money paid by a buyer
and specific restitution of property delivered by a seller are consistent with
the Principle of Consent; the recipient has undoubtedly agreed not to re-
tain such benefits if she fails to perform her side of the bargain.
If plaintiff's performance involves services or nonreturnable property,
the usual measure of money restitution is the market value of plaintiff's
bargained-for performaiice7 I have suggested that, under the liberal
at which seller consented to part with his labor and property).
72. Valid contracts must be distinguished from agreements held voidable for fraud, duress, or
mistake. When a contract is not tainted by any defect in the bargaining process, its terms, under the
liberal view, should control the restitutionary adjustment to the extent possible.
73. If buyer's benefit from seller's partial performance is exceeded by the pro rata restitution she
pays, such restitution will subject her to a net loss. In such a situation, pro rata restitution seems
inconsistent with the Principle of Minimal Coercion (it is difficult to justify coercion that merely shifts
a loss from one innocent party to another), unless the contractual agreement assigned the risk of such
loss to the buyer.
74. The majority view is that a party who has breached the oral contract cannot obtain restitution
for his partial performance. See, e.g., Watkins v. Wells, 303 Ky. 728, 730, 198 S.W.2d 662, 663
(1946); Mack v. Bragg, 30 Vt. 571, 572 (1858); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 1, § 19-41; 2
A. CORBIN, supra note 1, § 332; 2 G. PALMER, supra note 2, § 6.12(b). This view is consistent with
the rule that a party cannot obtain restitution if he is in material breach of an enforceable contract.
See id. In states that award restitution to a party in breach of an enforceable contract, courts can be
expected to award restitution to a party in breach of an unenforceable contract. Id.
75. E.g., Gilton v. Chapman, 217 Ark. 390, 391, 230 S.W.2d 37, 38 (1950); Wonsettler v. Lee,
40 Kan. 367, 369, 19 P. 862, 863 (1888); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 1, § 19-40; 2 A.
CORBIN, supra note 1, §§ 321, 325, 326; 2 G. PALMER, supra note 2, § 6.12(a); RESTATEMENT, supra
note 1, § 355 & comments a, b.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a contract that fails to satisfy the writing requirement is
enforceable to the extent of plaintiff's performance. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(c) (1977).
76. E.g., Bennett Leasing Co. v. Ellison, 15 Utah 2d 72, 75, 387 P.2d 246, 248 (1963); Cochran
v. Bise, 197 Va. 483, 487-89, 90 S.E.2d 178, 181-82 (1955); 2 G. PALMER, supra note 2, § 6.3(b);
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view, market value restitution is an improper remedy for breach of an
enforceable contract because it violates the Principle of Causal Responsi-
bility; the breaching party should be liable only for an amount that com-
pensates the plaintiff for losses caused by the breach, and the remedy
should thus be limited to plaintiff's expectancy damages. The same rea-
soning might seem applicable to market value restitution in favor of the
nonbreaching party who has partially performed a contract unenforceable
under the statute of frauds. But expectancy damages, or restitution based
on the contract price or contract rate, would enforce the terms of the oral
contract (at least to some extent) and thus frustrate the purpose of the
statute of frauds. Given this controlling purpose, market value restitution
is consistent with liberal principles.
77
F. Restitution When a Contract Is Unenforceable Because of Basic
Mistake
If party A made a basic mistake when entering into a contract with B,' 8
he may be allowed to avoid the contract if its performance would leave
him substantially worse off than he anticipated when he made the con-
tract. Although he has consented to the contract terms, A has not con-
sented to the adverse exchange of economic values thereby entailed. Thus,
there is a reason to disregard A's consent and nullify the contract. But
there is also a reason to enforce the contract, namely, to protect B's expec-
tancy, thus reinforcing the social practice of contracting.79 In deciding
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 347 & comment c, § 355; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, §
371 & comments a, b, §§ 373, 375. Most judicial opinions use the term "reasonable value." The
contemporary meaning of this term is "market value." E.g., Bennett Leasing Co., 15 Utah 2d at 76-
77, 387 P.2d at 249 (Henriod, C.J., dissenting); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 371 com-
ment a.
77. A plaintiff seller who has partially performed an unenforceable contract has not consented to
perform without compensation and thus deserves restitution that rectifies his involuntary transfer. The
statute of frauds, on the other hand, is designed to avoid forcing defendant to make an involuntary
transfer as a result of perjury and thus precludes remedies based on the terms of the alleged contract.
Although market value restitution is likely to result in a forced exchange on terms to which neither
party consented, it can be a reasonable compromise when the terms consented to cannot be enforced.
Market value restitution is consistent with the Principle of Minimal Coercion because it coerces de-
fendant only to the extent necessary to rectify plaintiff's involuntary transfer without frustrating the
purpose of the statute of frauds.
78. "Mistake" is a state of mind not in accord with the facts. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 500.
A mistake is "basic" if it is a serious mistake concerning a fact that provides a basis for the bargain, so
that the exchange required by the contract terms is substantially different from that presumed by the
mistaken party. See 2 G. PALMER, supra note 2, § 12.2; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 9 comment
c, § 16 comment c (1936). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, §§ 152, 153 (discussing
when mistake makes a contract voidable).
79. See 2 G. PALMER, supra note 2, § 12.2, at 533-34. If A seeks to avoid a contract on the
ground of basic mistake, and B shared A's mistaken belief or assumption (a "mutual mistake"), en-
forcement of the contract is likely to give B something better than she expected, for example a fertile
rather than a barren cow, as in Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887). This helps
explain why relief for mutual mistake has been more readily granted than relief for unilateral mis-
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whether to grant relief on the ground of mistake, courts balance these
competing concerns.8"
If the contract is declared unenforceable, each party is entitled to resti-
tution for any performance rendered to the other.81 The return of money
paid by a buyer, or specific restitution of property delivered by a seller,
restores both parties to their pre-contract positions and is consistent with
the Principle of Minimal Coercion. Assuming that A is the party who has
partially performed, such restitution coerces B only to the extent necessary
to rectify A's involuntary transfer. Because she is restored to the status
quo ante, B suffers no harm as a result of A's mistaken contractual assent.
Neither innocent party suffers a net loss.
If A has delivered services or property that cannot be returned in spe-
cie, the measure of money restitution would presumably be the market
value of A's partial performance.8 But when market value restitution
would be required, a court is unlikely to permit A to avoid the contract.
83
Market value restitution subjects B to a forced exchange and may require
B to pay more for A's partial performance than B would have been will-
ing to pay. If there is a serious risk that avoidance and restitution would
leave B worse off than before, the contract probably will be enforced.
84
Although the need to save A from serious loss might outweigh the need to
protect B's expectancy, it does not outweigh the need to protect B against
loss. There is no reason to shift loss from an innocent but mistaken party
to an innocent party who made no mistake. Avoidance with restitution
would therefore violate the Principle of Minimal Coercion because it
would coercively subject B to a harm not justified by any higher-priority
interest of A.
85
take. See 2 G. PALMER, supra note 2, §§ 12.1, at 532, 12.3(c).
80. The need to balance such concerns is noted in J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 1, § 9-
25; 2 G. PALMER, supra note 2, § 12.2; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, introductory note to
ch. 6, at 379-80.
81. See, e.g., 2 G. PALMER, supra note 2, § 12.6(a); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, §
158(1).
82. See, e.g., Tyra v. Cheney, 129 Minn. 428, 430, 152 N.W. 835, 835 (1915); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), supra note 1, § 371 & comments a, b, § 376 illustration 3. Restitution should not be
measured by the contract terms because the contract is tainted by a serious defect in the bargaining
process (the mistake).
83. For example, after partial performance of a construction contract, a contractor will probably
not be allowed to avoid the contract and obtain restitution because of his mistaken bid. 2 G. PALMER,
supra note 2, § 12.20(d).
84. It is often said that one party cannot ordinarily avoid a contract for mistake if the other party
cannot be restored to the status quo ante. See, e.g., Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U.S. 55, 62 (1876); M.F.
Kemper Constr. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 37 Cal. 2d 696, 701, 235 P.2d 7, 10 (1951); Olson v.
Shephard, 165 Minn. 433, 436, 206 N.W. 711, 712 (1926); 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 1, § 606, at 649-
50.
85. If B knew (or should have known) at the time of contracting that A's assent was based on a
serious mistake, relief for A is likely, even though it requires market value restitution for A's perform-
ance. Tyra v. Cheney, 129 Minn. 428, 152 N.W. 835 (1915); 2 G. PALMER, supra note 2, §§ 12.3(a),
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G. Restitution When a Contract Is Unenforceable Because of Fraud or
Duress
A person who has been induced into a contract by fraud may avoid the
contract and obtain restitution for any performance rendered."8 The same
rights are granted to a person coerced into a contract through duress.
8 7
The victim of fraud or duress has suffered an interference with his free-
dom to dispose of his property only through informed and voluntary con-
sent; in a liberal legal system, his assent to the contract is therefore invalid
and the contract is unenforceable.
Restitution, like avoidance, protects the victim's autonomy; its purpose
is to rectify the victim's involuntary transfer.88 In measuring restitution,
the contract terms must be disregarded because fraud or duress is a fatal
defect in the bargaining process. The victim is entitled to restitution of
money paid, to specific restitution of property that can be returned, and
probably to market value restitution for performance involving services or
nonreturnable property; the victim must also restore any performance ren-
dered by the other party.8 9
The measure of the victim's restitution, however, is regulated by an
important principle. If the other party is guilty of duress or tortious fraud,
she has wrongfully interfered with her victim's freedom of choice; restitu-
tion will be fashioned so as to ensure that the victim is fully restored to his
pre-contract position and does not suffer any loss as a result of the wrong-
ful interference with his liberty. For example, a defrauded vendor of land
not only recovers the land but also the fair rental value for the duration of
the purchaser's occupancy or the profits derived by the purchaser from her
use of the land, whichever is greater.90
12.20(d), at 694; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, §§ 153, 376 illustration 3. B's conduct is at
worst fraudulent and at best careless. The need to enforce the contract to protect reasonable expecta-
tions disappears because B's expectations are not reasonable; A thus deserves to be relieved from
performance. Market value restitution is justified, even though it may involve harmful interference
with B's liberty. Because of B's fraudulent or careless conduct, A's liberty (not to partially perform for
nothing) has priority over B's liberty.
86. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 1, § 9-23; 1 G. PALMER, supra note 2, §§ 3.1, 3.3;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, §§ 164, 376.
87. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 1, § 9-8; 2 G. PALMER, supra note 2, § 9.1, at 242-43;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, §§ 174-76, 376.
88. See, e.g., Earl v. Saks & Co., 36 Cal. 2d 602, 611, 226 P.2d 340, 346 (1951); Brett v. Cooney,
75 Conn. 338, 53 A. 729 (1902).
89. 1. G. PALMER, supra note 2, §§ 3.3, 3.11 (fraud); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, §
371 & comments a, b, §§ 372, 376, 384 (duress).
90. Lang v. Giraudo, 311 Mass. 132, 140, 40 N.E.2d 707, 711 (1942); 1 G. PALMER, supra note
2, § 3.15(a); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 157 & comments a, d, illustration 3 (1936). This
approach ensures that the vendor is compensated, as fully as possible, for economic opportunities lost
as a result of the transfer. A defrauded purchaser of land, on the other hand, gets his money back,
gives the land back, and pays the vendor the lesser of fair rental value or profits derived from his use
of the land. Beaudry v. Favreau, 99 N.H. 444, 447-48, 114 A.2d 666, 668-69 (1955); 1 G. PALMER,
supra note 2, § 3.12, at 303-04, § 3.14(b); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 155, 157 comment d, §
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In a liberal legal system, the victim of fraud or duress will not be al-
lowed to suffer loss as a result of wrongful interference with his freedom
to dispose of his property voluntarily. If the court cannot restore both
parties to their pre-contract positions, the innocent victim will be fully
restored at the expense of the party who has wrongfully interfered with
his liberty. But the wrongdoer is coerced no more than is necessary to
compensate the victim for the wrongful interference. The restitutionary
remedy is thus consistent with the Principle of Causal Responsibility.
H. Restitution for an Unsolicited Benefit Intentionally Conferred
Restitution is not limited to contractual situations. A person might ob-
tain restitution for a benefit conferred upon someone who has not con-
tracted for or requested the benefit. Consider, first, situations in which P
knowingly and intentionally confers an unsolicited benefit upon D. As-
suming that the benefit cannot be returned in specie,91 P is generally una-
ble to obtain money restitution for a benefit intentionally conferred upon
D without D's request. Obligations to pay for benefits usually arise only
through consent. If P intended to make a gift to D, P obviously is not
entitled to restitution, since P has not suffered any involuntary depriva-
tion."2 If P did not intend a gift, it is likely that he attempted to force D
into an exchange without benefit of contract. A liberal legal system will
not permit such interference with D's freedom. If P did not give D an
opportunity to reject the benefit, P is likely to be regarded as an officious
intermeddler and be denied restitution. 3 Even if P is neither a donor nor
an intermeddler, he is unlikely to receive money restitution for a benefit D
159 comment a (1936). Payment of a rental exceeding his profit would leave the defrauded purchaser
with a net loss. If A pays B $10,000 in exchange for B's promise not to press criminal charges against
A's relative who has embezzled $8000 from B, A is a victim of duress and can recover the entire
$10,000, even though B had an $8000 claim against A's relative. E.g., Quinn v. United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co., 163 Minn. 320, 204 N.W. 156 (1925); Adams v. Irving Nat'l Bank, 116 N.Y. 606, 23
N.E. 7 (1889); 2 G. PALMER, supra note 2, § 9.11. Restitution is measured not by B's $2000 enrich-
ment, but by A's $10,000 coerced deprivation. Restitution in any lesser amount would leave A with a
net loss.
91. If the unsolicited benefit can be returned in specie and D retains it, she may be liable for
money restitution. D. DOBBS, supra note 8, § 4.9, at 303-04. Or she may be deemed to have accepted
a contractual offer. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 1, § 2-21, at 67; RESTATEMENT, supra
note 1, § 72(2); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 69(2). But see 39 U.S.C. § 3009(b) (1976)
(unsolicited merchandise received by mail may be retained without obligation).
92. Restitution is unlikely if there has been no involuntary deprivation. For example, when the
benefit to D is merely an incidental consequence of P doing something beneficial for himself, P is not
entitled to restitution. If P pumps water from his own quarry, and this has the incidental effect of
draining D's quarry as well, D does not have to pay P anything. Ulmer v. Farnsworth, 80 Me. 500,
15 A. 65 (1888); see 2 G. PALMER, supra note 2, § 10.7(a); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 106
(1936). D's enrichment has not come at P's expense (D is merely the beneficiary of an externality).
93. See D. DOBBS, supra note 8, § 4.9. Thus, a repairman cannot obtain restitution for additional
repairs on a motorboat if the owner had requested only that the motor be tuned. J.L. Carpenter Co.
v. Richardson, 118 Conn. 322, 172 A. 226 (1934).
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never requested and cannot return; such restitution would subject D to a
forced exchange."'
In a few situations, however, restitution is awarded to P for an unsolic-
ited benefit intentionally conferred. For example, a physician or hospital
providing emergency medical services to an unconscious patient may re-
cover from the patient the market value of the services rendered.9 5 In such
circumstances, it is difficult to regard P as either a donor or an officious
intermeddler, and D undoubtedly would have agreed to pay for the bene-
fit if bargaining had been possible. Under the Principle of Minimal Coer-
cion, restitution is justified because its interference with D's liberty is less
serious than the deprivation P would suffer were restitution to be
denied."
I. Restitution for an Unsolicited Benefit Conferred by Mistake
When an unsolicited benefit is conferred by mistake, the transferor's
consent is defective, and the transfer is, in a sense, involuntary. Restitu-
tion appears to be warranted by the need to avoid an involuntary transfer
of wealth. Since D, the recipient of the benefit, has no contractual expec-
tancy to protect, restitution is likely to be granted as long as D is restored
to the status quo ante and does not suffer a net loss. Under the Principle
of Minimal Coercion, it is difficult to justify a coercive remedy that
merely shifts a loss from one innocent person to another without promot-
94. For example, when P's performance of a contract with D's tenant improves D's land, P is not
entitled to restitution from D if D never requested P's performance. E.g., Goldberg v. Ford, 188 Md.
658, 53 A.2d 665 (1947); Puttkammer v. Minth, 83 Wis. 2d 686, 266 N.W.2d 361 (1978); 2 G.
PALMER, supra note 2, § 10.7(b).
95. Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601, 104 S.W. 164 (1907); In re Crisan Estate, 362 Mich. 569,
107 N.W.2d 907 (1961); 2 G. PALMER, supra note 2, § 10.4, at 375-77; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITU-
TION § 116 & comment a (1936).
96. There are also situations in which P obtains restitution for his payment of D's obligation.
Assume P, a mortgagee, pays taxes owed by D, the mortgagor, to prevent foreclosure of a prior tax
lien on the real estate. P is subrogated to the government's right against D. Wyoming Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Mills Constr. Co., 38 Wyo. 515, 269 P. 45 (1928); 2 G. PALMER, supra note 2, § 10.5(a). If
P settles T's unliquidated tort claim with a payment to T, and D is found solely liable for the tort, P
can obtain restitution from D to the extent that P's payment was reasonable. Northwestern Nat'l
Casualty Co. v. State Auto. & Casualty Underwriters, 35 Wis. 2d 237, 151 N.W.2d 104 (1967);
Perkins v. Worzala, 31 Wis. 2d 634, 143 N.W.2d 516 (1966); 2 G. PALMER, supra note 2, § 10.6(a).
When P, who is secondarily liable as a surety, has paid D's debt to C, P can obtain restitution from
D on a direct claim or by way of subrogation to C's rights against D. Knighton v. Curry, 62 Ala. 404
(1878); Hazelton v. Valentine, 113 Mass. 472 (1873); Sheridan v. Dudden Implement, Inc., 174 Neb.
578, 119 N.W.2d 64 (1962); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 76 & comment b, § 162 & comment b
(1936).
In each of these situations, P was merely protecting his own interests or performing his own legal
duty; the circumstances negate both donative intent and officious meddling. Because D already has a
legal obligation to pay someone, restitution does not really impose a new obligation and thus does not
interfere with her liberty in a significant way. Interference with D's liberty is minimal and is justified,
under the Principle of Minimal Coercion, by the need to impose the burden of payment on the
wrongdoer (delinquent taxpayer, tortfeasor, or delinquent debtor) in order to promote deterrence.
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ing greater justice.9"
When P seeks restitution of money paid by mistake or specific restitu-
tion of property transferred by mistake, restitution will normally restore
both parties to their previous positions without either party suffering a net
loss.9" In some situations, restitution would subject D to a net loss (a posi-
tion worse than her status quo ante)."9 If D is an innocent party, she is
likely to have a valid defense to P's claim for restitution.100
97. Although the need to avoid involuntary loss by the mistaken party gets priority over the recip-
ient's liberty to retain a windfall gain, it does not get priority over the recipient's right to be free from
harmful interference (interference imposing a net loss).
98. Thus, if P pays his creditor too much or pays a debt a second time, he can obtain restitution
of the overpayment. E.g., Haralson County v. Golden, 104 Ga. 19, 30 S.E. 380 (1898); 3 G. PALMER,
supra note 2, § 14.8; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 18, 20 (1936). When P pays D's mortgage
debt as a result of some mistake, he is entitled to restitution from D by way of subrogation to the
claim and lien of the mortgagee. Carter v. Carter, 251 Ala. 598, 38 So. 2d 557 (1949); Stewart v.
Stewart, 90 Wis. 516, 63 N.W. 886 (1895); 3 G. PALMER, supra note 2, § 14.18(b). If, as a result of
a basic mistake, P has made a gift of money or property that can be returned in specie, and he would
not have made the gift if he had known the truth, he is entitled to restitution from the donee. Stone v.
Stone, 319 Mich. 194, 29 N.W.2d 271 (1947); Deskovick v. Porzio, 78 N.J. Super. 82, 87-89, 187
A.2d 610, 612-13 (1963); 4 G. PALMER, supra note 2, §§ 18.2-18.4, 18.6; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITU.
TION §§ 26(1)(b), 39, 49(1)(b) (1936).
99. If P constructs an improvement on D's land in the mistaken belief that he is improving his
own land, the traditional ruling is that P cannot obtain money restitution as affirmative relief. Buswell
v. Hadfield, 202 Ark. 200, 149 S.W.2d 555 (1941); Billings v. Hall, 7 Cal. 1 (1857); 2 G. PALMER,
supra note 2, § 10.9(a); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 42(1) (1936).
If P performs services that benefit D, P mistakenly believing that D has contracted for such ser-
vices, restitution will be denied. Smith v. Kneisley, 187 Wash. 278, 60 P.2d 14 (1936); 3 G. PALMER,
supra note 2, § 14.15(b); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 41(a)(iii) (1936). If, however, D knew
that P believed he had a contract, and D nonetheless permitted P to render the services, P can obtain
money restitution equal to the market value of his services. Hawkins v. Lange, 22 Minn. 557 (1876);
Henrietta Nat'l Bank v. Barrett, 25 S.W. 456 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894); 3 G. PALMER, supra note 2, §
14.15(b); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 40(c) & comment d (1936). In this case, D has interfered
with P's freedom of choice.
With respect to both improvements and services, specific restitution is not feasible, and money resti-
tution forces D to pay for something she never bargained for and may not want. See D. DOBBS, supra
note 8, § 11.1 1, at 783. Money restitution thus involves an excessive risk that D will suffer a net loss,
a harmful interference with her liberty.
Nonetheless, a number of recent decisions have awarded restitution to the mistaken improver as
affirmative relief. See decisions cited in 2 G. PALMER, supra note 2, § 10.9(c). The measure of restitu-
tion is the enhanced market value of the land or the cost incurred by P, whichever is less. Id. §
10.9(e). This reduces the risk that D will suffer a net loss and ensures that she does not pay more
than necessary to rectify P's involuntary transfer of wealth. In order to grant restitution and still
protect D against harmful interference with her liberty, some courts give D a choice: she may either
pay restitution for the improvement or convey title to P in exchange for the unimproved value of the
land. See id. § 10.9(c).
100. When P has paid money to D through mistake, and D received the money in good faith and
in discharge of a third person's debt, D has the defense of "discharge for value," so long as she had a
valid claim against the third person and knew she had a claim. Strubbe v. Sonnenschein, 299 F.2d
185 (2d Cir. 1962); Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 191 Neb. 212, 214 N.W.2d
493 (1974); Richey v. Clark, 11 Utah 467, 40 P. 717 (1895); 3 G. PALMER, supra note 2, § 16.6. If P
has paid money to D because of some mistake, and D uses the money for an expenditure or gift she
would not have made in the absence of P's payment, D has the defense of "change of position."
Sawyer v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 236 F.2d 518, 522 (10th Cir. 1956); 3 G. PALMER, supra
note 2, § 16.8(e); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 142 comment b (1936). This defense is also open
to D if she passes the money on to a third person pursuant to some fiduciary obligation. United States
v. Cambridge Trust Co., 300 F.2d 76, 78 (1st Cir. 1962); Hibbs v. First Nat'l Bank, 133 Va. 94, 112
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J. Liberal Principles in the Law of Restitution: A Summary
Some general observations emerge from the preceding survey of restitu-
tionary remedies. Restitution usually serves the liberal purpose of rectify-
ing an involuntary transfer. If both parties can be restored to their pre-
transaction positions, restitution is readily granted. Problems arise when
restoration of both parties is impossible. Such problems are generally re-
solved in a manner consistent with liberal principles. Under the Principle
of Minimal Coercion, restitution will be granted to P only to the extent
that P's liberty gets priority over D's liberty. If D has not wrongfully
interfered with P's liberty, P's liberty ceases to enjoy priority at the point
where restitution would subject the innocent D to a serious loss.101 Loss
will not be shifted from one innocent party to another; such a shift entails
coercion without any gain in justice. If D has wrongfully interfered with
P's liberty, P's liberty gets priority over D's liberty and P is entitled to
restitution that fully compensates him for harm caused by D's wrong,
even if this leaves D with a serious loss. 02 Such restitution is consistent
with the Principle of Causal Responsibility. But this Principle precludes
supercompensatory restitution unless D has contractually consented to
make such restitution, in which case it is permitted under the Principle of
Consent.108
Our survey indicates that the law of restitution is usually consistent
with liberal principles. 0 These principles are undercut in some cases by
the method used to determine the amount of restitution.0 5 But only in the
case of money restitution as a remedy for breach of contract when P is a
partially performing seller is the law of restitution wholly incompatible
with liberal principles.
S.E. 669 (1922); 3 G. PALMER, supra note 2, § 16.8(a), (b); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 143
(1936).
101. Thus, when P has intentionally conferred an unsolicited benefit on D, restitution is granted
only if it does not seriously interfere with D's liberty. When P seeks to avoid a contract for mistake, or
has mistakenly conferred an unsolicited benefit on D, restitution is not granted if it would subject D to
a net loss.
102. Thus, when P avoids a contract on the ground of fraud or duress, he will be fully restored to
his pre-contract position, regardless of where this leaves D.
103. Thus, to remedy a breach of contract, a buyer may recover money paid and a seller may
obtain specific restitution, even if the result is supercompensatory.
104. When P is in material breach of contract and seeks restitution, various judicial responses
appear to violate the Principle of Minimal Coercion. The law on this issue, however, is so confused
and unsettled that it cannot be regarded as a clear exception to any proposition.
When a contract is unenforceable under the statute of frauds, market value restitution is used and
may be supercompensatory, an apparent violation of the Principle of Causal Responsibility necessi-
tated by a statutory policy precluding use of the contract terms. Restitution may be regarded as consis-
tent with the Principle of Minimal Coercion. See supra note 77.
105. See supra note 73.
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Conclusion
Most of the rules governing restitution as a remedy for breach of con-
tract are reasonable and have been accepted without controversy. A buyer
plaintiff should be allowed to recover any money he paid to the defendant
seller. A seller plaintiff should be awarded specific restitution whenever
this is feasible. A seller plaintiff who has fully performed should be de-
nied restitution.
The controversial issue concerns the measure of money restitution for a
seller whose partial performance cannot be returned in specie. The pre-
vailing view is that the seller should recover the market value of his par-
tial performance. One opposing view is that money restitution should be
limited either by the contract price or the contract rate. This Article
presents another opposing view; it concludes that the partially performing
seller should be denied money restitution and be limited to his expectancy
damages. This conclusion, derived from liberal principles of justice, which
usually impel courts to protect personal liberty and minimize coercion, is
strengthened by the relative conformity of other areas of restitution law
with liberal legal principles.
Restitution serves a worthy purpose when used to rectify involuntary
transfers of wealth. But the remedy should be limited within boundaries
imposed by liberal principles of justice. A person who breaches a contract
does not thereby forfeit her right to have those boundaries respected.
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